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SURVEY OF SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS:
CLASS ACTIONS
IAIN D. JOHNSTON*

Last year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "the class action
is an awkward device, requiring careful judicial supervision." 1 Indeed it is.
Few procedural rules produce more commentary and published decisions
than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions in
federal court. 2 Each year the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals and
the federal district courts across the country struggle with the language and
requirements of Rule 23, often producing conflicting decisions.
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
published six noteworthy opinions addressing class action issues. This
article will address the six cases individually, describing the facts, analyses
and holdings of each case, as well as addressing possible consequences
resulting from the decision. Two recurring themes permeate five of the six
cases. The first theme is the Court's distrust of class action counsel.3 The
second theme is that district courts have numerous, nondelegable duties they
must fulfill in class action cases. In the Seventh Circuit, the Court's distrust
of class action counsel drives its imposition of these duties on the district
courts.
I.

PAYTON V. COUNTY OF KANE

Payton v. County of Kane4 is the most important class action decision
the Seventh Circuit issued in 2002. Although the decision addresses neither
the Court's distrust of class-action counsel nor the duties of the
district
5
courts, it illustrates how "[t]he class action is an awkward device."
A.

Facts of Payton

Before 1999, at least nineteen counties in Illinois charged a "bail fee"

lain Johnston is senior counsel at the Chicago, Illinois office of Holland & Knight, LLP.
He wishes to thank Kristen Clayton for convincing him to write this article.

1. Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002).
2. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.
3. See Culver, 277 F.3d at 913 (noting "Experience teaches that it is counsel for the
class representative and not the named parties, who direct and manage these actions.
Every experienced federal judge knows that any statements to the contrary is [sic] sheer

sophistry."). Id.
4. 308 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002) petition for cert. filed 71 U.S.L.W. 3709 (U.S. Apr.
25, 2003) (No. 02-1584).
5. Culver, 277 F.3d at 910.
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to detainees released on bail or their own recognizance. 6 The fee collected
above the amount of bail actually due varied by county.7 In 1999, Illinois
enacted Public Act 91-0094, which provided Illinois counties with the
explicit authority to impose bail fees, labeled "bond fees." 8 After the
enactment of and pursuant to the statute, every county in Illinois imposed a
bond fee between one dollar and forty-five dollars. 9 Among these counties
were Kane County, which charged
eleven dollars, and DuPage County,
0
which charged fifteen dollars.'
In Payton, the named plaintiffs, acting as class representatives, filed a
suit against nineteen Illinois counties claiming that the counties violated the
class representatives' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring
them to pay bond fees." In 1997, two of the named plaintiffs had to post
bond and a bond fee of fifteen dollars before they were released from the
DuPage County Jail.' 2 In 1998, the remaining named plaintiffs, had to post
bond and a bond fee
of eleven dollars before they were released from the
3
Kane County Jail.'
But, the plaintiffs did not limit the defendants to DuPage County and
Kane County.' 4 Instead, they named seventeen additional counties which
never incarcerated the named plaintiffs. 5 The parties did not contest that
these seventeen counties never injured the named plaintiffs.' 6 Rather, the
named plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of both individuals
confined in the various Counties' jails who posted bond fees and individuals
who could satisfy the actual bond requirement, but not the additional bond
fee. 17 The defendants moved to dismiss the entire case.' 8 The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the entire case and did not
consider the plaintiffs' motion for the court's class certification.' 9
B. Analysis
The Seventh Circuit quickly reversed the district court on two
preliminary issues. First, the Court found that the individual plaintiffs stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted and had standing to bring these
individual claims against Kane and DuPage Counties.20 Second, the Court
reversed the district court's determination that a class action could not

6. Payton, 308 F.3d at 675.

7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 675-76.
12. Id. at 675.
13. Payton, 308 F.3d at 675.
14. Id at 675.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.at 678.
Id.at 676.
Id.at 675-76.
Id.at675.

19. Id.at 676.

20. Payton, 308 F.3d at 676-77.
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proceed against DuPage County and Kane County. 21 In doing so, the
Seventh Circuit noted that, curiously, on the same day the district court
dismissed this action, it granted class certification in two similar cases.22
The real issue, and the one that may lead to review by the United States
Supreme Court,23 was whether the named plaintiffs could certify a class
against the seventeen other county defendants who admittedly never injured
the named plaintiffs.24 Before addressing this issue, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the plaintiffs did not properly move to certify a defendant class.
This fact put an even finer point on the issue: how can the named plaintiffs
link the seventeen other defendants, which never harmed even one of the
named plaintiffs with the two defendants
that allegedly may have harmed
26
one of the putative class representatives?
The Seventh Circuit initially stated that this issue presented a classic
standing problem; namely, that to bring a valid cause of action, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant wronged the plaintiff.27 Framing the issue this
way quickly leads to the conclusion that no claim exists, and thus no class
can be certified.
But, if the issue is framed in the context of the judicially created
"juridical link" doctrine,2 8 the result is much different. According to the
Seventh Circuit, "[I]f all the defendants took part in a similar scheme that
was sustained either by a contract or conspiracy, or was mandated by a
uniform state rule, it is appropriate to join as defendants even parties with
whom the named class representative did not have direct contact., 29 To
reach the juridical link doctrine, however, the Court was required to address
class action issues before standing issues. 30 The Court then avoided the
question whether class certification
was proper because the district court
31
never conducted that analysis.
After stating it was avoiding the issue of whether the class should have

21. Id. at 677.
22. Id. (citing Coleman v. County of Kane, 196 F.R.D. 505 (N.D. 111.
2000) and

Ringswald v. County of DuPage, 196 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. I11.
2000)). Despite noting the fact
that the defendants ultimately prevailed in these cases, the Seventh Circuit warned the
district court not to consider the merits of the Payton plaintiffs' claims when determining
class certification on remand. Id.at 677 (citing West v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 282 F.3d
935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002)).

23. See supra note 4 (noting that filing of a petition for certiorari).
24. Payton,308 F.3d at 677-78.
25. Id. at 678.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The juridical link doctrine allows plaintiffs to sue all defendants similarly
situated if they can show that all their injuries arose out of the same legal rule that was
binding on all of the defendants. Id.
29. Id.at 679.
30. Id.Indeed, the genesis of the juridical link doctrine, La Mar v. H & B Novelty &
Loan Co., explicitly recognized that the juridical link doctrine was a class action analysis,
not a standing analysis, even though many of the standing concepts overlap. La Mar v. H
& B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461,469-70 (9th Cir. 1973).
31. Payton, 308 F.2d at 680.
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been certified, the Seventh Circuit proceeded to adopt the juridical link
doctrine.32 According to the Court, "If the defendants with whom the named
representative did not interact directly are following a common statute...
we see nothing in either standing doctrine or Rule 23 that automatically
precludes use of the class action device." 33 The Seventh Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court
and remanded the case for further proceedings
34
consistent with the opinion.
C. Analysis and Possible Consequences of the Opinion
The decision in Payton, relying on the juridical link doctrine, is
troubling. By adopting the juridical link doctrine, the Seventh Circuit avoids
fundamental standing requirements. Effectively, in the name of efficiency,
the Court allowed a plaintiff to sue a defendant who did not injure the
plaintiff. Moreover, in analyzing difficult class action issues, courts are
often concerned about due process principles, including fundamental
fairness. It seems hard to imagine a scenario more unfair than to require a
defendant to defend against allegations made by a plaintiff whom the
defendant never injured, By asserting that class action issues should be
addressed before standing issues, the Seventh Circuit was able to bypass the
standing dilemma presented by the facts of the case. But, to the extent the
Seventh Circuit was concerned about providing complete relief, this concern
was unnecessary.35 When various government entities engage in similar
conduct and only a subset of those entities is sued, the other entities normally
closely monitor the litigation and adjust their behavior depending on the
outcome of the litigation. Additionally, a desire to centralize the issue and
offer complete relief conflicts with the decentralized decision making
process the Seventh Circuit espoused in at least one other class action case it
decided in 2002.36
II.

REYNOLDS V. BENEFICIAL NATIONAL BANK

Perhaps because of the egregious facts, the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Reynolds v. National Bank37 best exemplifies the Court's distrust of class
action counsel and the resulting burdens placed on district courts because of
32. Id.at 680.

33. Id.
at 681-82.
34. Id.at 682.

35. Id. at 681-82.
36. See infra Part IV (examining In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th
Cir. 2002)). Although this article is limited to reviewing Seventh Circuit decisions, it
should be noted that Illinois law would not appear to accept the juridical link doctrine.

Glazewski v. Coronet Ins. Co., 108 I11.
2d. 243 (1985); Hess v. I.R.E. Real Estate Income
Fund, 629 N.E.2d 520 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1993). See also Kittay v. Allstate Ins. Co., 397
N.E.2d 200, 203 (II1.App. IstDist. 1979) (stating that plaintiffs in a class action suit do
not have standing against twenty defendants with whom plaintiffs had no relationship).
Since plaintiffs had suffered no injury as a result of defendants' conduct, the Kittay court
found that "plaintiffs cannot represent as a class those persons having possible actions
against these 20 defendants and, thus, plaintiffs may not bring this suit against them." Id.
37. 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002).
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that distrust.
A.

Factsof Reynolds

The facts surrounding the issue in this case relate to refund anticipation
loans (RAL), which are sometimes-and for this case, erroneously-referred to
as "Rapid Refunds., 38 The plaintiffs were H&R Block's (Block) customers,
who could not wait a few weeks to obtain their refund checks from the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 39 Block offered the plaintiffs RAL, a loan
from the time of the filing of the return to the issuance of the refund check,4 °
in the amount of the anticipated refund. Block would offer the RAL to the
customers, but Beneficial National Bank (Beneficial) would actually make
the loan for an annual interest rate often exceeding 100%. 41 Customers who
obtained RALs through Block were not informed that Block was a partowner of the loan and that Beneficial paid Block a fee for every loan
obtained.42
After 1990, the defendants had more than twenty class actions filed
against them alleging a variety of claims, including consumer fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. 3 Most of these suits failed. But, in the late 1990s
some suits survived, including a case in Texas that was scheduled for trial.44
Then in 1997, two lawyers who filed two of the unsuccessful cases,
along with another plaintiffs attorney named Harris, had lunch with
Beneficial's lead counsel. 45 At this meeting, Beneficial's counsel discussed
"a global RAL settlement" with the plaintiff attorneys, and, according to
Harris, "threw out" a settlement number of $24 or $25 million.46 Although
Beneficial's counsel later denied this, the district judge found Harris'
statement to be credible.47 Despite the discussion, the parties did not reach a
fruitful settlement at this lunch.48
In 1998, the three plaintiffs' attorneys joined forces with "a substantial
law firm," many of whom were "settlement class lawyers," and filed two

38. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 281. In Reynolds, the term "rapid refunds" was a misnomer.
Id. at 286. Rapid refunds were at issue in two separate classes in which the plaintiffs
alleged that Block would charge a separate fee for a promise that the taxpayer would
quickly receive a refund from the IRS. Id.at 285. According to this class action, Block
knew that the IRS was closely scrutinizing returns seeking an Earned Income Tax Credit
and therefore, no refund would be rapid. Id.
39. Id. at 280.
40. Id.
41.

Id.

42. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 280.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id.Counsel for Block was not present. Id.None of the plaintiffs' attorneys had
any action pending against either defendant. Id.at 280-8 1.
46. Id at 280-81. Even stranger, one of the unsuccessful plaintiffs' attorneys "bought"
a client from another lawyer in promise for $100,000 referral fee. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at
281.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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49
suits against Beneficial, alleging claims similar to those raised previously.
One of the lawsuits also named Block and three Block affiliates. But, in
response to a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Block
and two of the affiliates. 5 ° Settlement negotiations then began between
counsel for the plaintiffs, Beneficial and Block. 51 Although no claims were
pending against it, Block was included in the negotiations because Beneficial
was contractually required to indemnify Block for any liability arising from
the RAL 2
In 1999, a class represented by the settlement class lawyers entered into
a settlement with Beneficial and Block, which the class submitted to the
district court for approval.53 In exchange for releases, all 17 million or so
members of the class who obtained RAL between 1987 and 1999 could
submit a claim for a refund, not to exceed fifteen dollars.5 4 A $25 million
settlement fund was created to pay all the claims. Any remaining money
would revert to Beneficial and Block, who would evenly split the costs of the
settlement, including class notice and the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 55 In
addition, Beneficial
and Block agreed to pay the settlement class lawyers up
56
to $4.25 million.
The district court approved all settlement terms 57 except the provisions
that allowed the reversion and required a $30 refund for parties who received
two or more RALs.5 8 Of the millions of notices mailed, only one million
persons filed claims for fifteen or thirty dollar refunds. 59 Of the remaining
notices, several million were undeliverable. Six thousand persons opted out
of the class.60 In determining that $25 million was adequate, the district
court relied on an unsworn report of an accountant who was not deposed or
cross-examined. 61 However, others objected to the settlement and appealed
the court's approval.62

B.

Court'sAnalysis

The Seventh Circuit tellingly framed the issue as, "The principal issue
presented by these appeals is whether the district judge discharged the
judicial duty to protect the members of a class in class action litigation from
lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of their professional and

49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 281. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires court
approval of all class action settlements. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
54. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 281-82.
55. Id. at 281-82.

56. Id. at 282-83.
57. Id.at 282.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 282.
62. Id.
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fiduciary obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the
class. 63 According to the appellants, the settlement agreement resulted from
a "reverse auction.' 64 A reverse auction occurs when "the defendants in a
series of class actions picks the most ineffectual class lawyers [with whom]
to negotiate a settlement [so that] the district court will approve a weak
settlement that will preclude [all further] claims against defendant. ''65 Under
a reverse auction, nearly everybody is happy. The plaintiffs' attorneys are
happy because they get a windfall without much effort. The defendants are
happy because they purchase releases for all claims at a substantially
discounted rate.66 And reading between the lines of the Reynolds opinion,
the district court is theoretically happy because a large, cumbersome case is
no longer on its docket. 67 The only parties not happy in a reverse auction are
the class members, who were represented by attorneys they never met nor
hired, and from whom they did not receive vigorous or even adequate
representation.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the district court judge did not
68
engage in the thorough and careful analysis required by the settlement.
The Court found that the $25 million settlement was far too lOW. 69 The
Court focused on the existence of the Texas action, in which the plaintiffs
sought disgorgement. According to the Seventh Circuit, the Texas action
raised the defendants' potential exposure to $2 billion. 70 The Seventh Circuit
was also concerned that the district court permitted the class settlement
lawyers to submit their fee applications in camera.71 The Court referred to
the settlement agreement and process as occurring under "suspicious
circumstances. 72 Moreover, it was concerned that the proposed settlement
swept two separate class actions into the settlement agreement. 73 The first
class action brought claims against Block relating to "rapid refunds," a term
that was included in the settlement agreement out of unfortunate
happenstance. 74 The second asserted claims against Block based on its
alleged practice of "intercepting refunds. 75

63. Id.at 279.
64. Id at 282.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. As a former clerk to a federal district court judge, the author generally has more
faith in the motivations of district court judges. Although over-worked and comparatively
underpaid, district court judges generally seek equitable results. The author, like any
experienced litigator, has witnessed instances that test this faith, but those experiences are
rare.
68. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 283.
69. See id.
(noting that proposed settlement figure would not be sufficient to pay the
number of anticipated claims).
70. Id.
71. Id. at284.
72. Id.
73. Id.at 285.
74. Id.at 285-86.
75. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 286. This practice occurred when "Block would apply to the
IRS for a refund [on behalf of the] customer but [would] direct that the refund be paid to
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In deciding the case, the Seventh Circuit offered guidance on the
process for valuing class action settlements. It suggested that the district
court could order the parties to present evidence of four possible outcomes:
high, medium, low and zero,76 presumably, from which the district court
could better evaluate the settlement. In light of "all things considered," the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court judge abused its discretion
in approving the settlement.77 As a result, the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded the case, rejecting the settlement agreement.
The Seventh
Circuit ordered that the district court transfer the case to a different judge on
remand.79
C. Analysis and Possible Consequences of the Opinion
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Reynolds may result in three possible
consequences. First, after the Seventh Circuit's strong criticism, district
court judges may spend extraordinary resources in determining whether a
class action settlement is proper. Second, district courts are now likely to
require counsel to submit evidence corresponding to the four outcomes.
Third, district court judges may seek to have "fairness hearings" conducted
by special masters, particularly in complex cases. Using special masters may
even be more cost effective in the end because it will allow a decision maker
to devote substantial time to determining the fairness of the settlement,
thereby increasing the likelihood of a just result.
III. UHL v. THOROUGHBRED

TECHNOLOGY & TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
8

In Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology. & Telecommunications., Inc., 0
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's certification of the class and
approval of a creative class settlement. 8' Although the Court reiterated that
district courts have fiduciary duties to absent class members, 82 the class
counsel in Uhl cannot be accused of self-dealing. Indeed, under the
settlement, "class counsel [could] never receive compensation83 that [was]
more advantageous than that which goes to the class members."
A.

Factsof Uhl

The case arose after Northfolk Southern Railway (Northfolk) decided
to venture into the telecommunications industry by granting its subsidiary, a
company called Thoroughbred Technology & Telecommunications (Tit." Id. From the refund, Block would deduct any amount it thought the customer owed it.

Id.
76. Id at 285.
77. Id. at 286.
78. Id. at 289.
79. Id. (applying on remand Circuit Rule 36, which requires that the district court
reassign a case to a different judge when a case is remanded on appeal).
80. 309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2002).
81. Uhl, 309 F.3d at 987-88.
82. Id. at 985.
83. Id. at 982.
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Cubed), the right to lay fiber optic cable in the corridors along its railway
easements. 84 When T-Cubed announced it had the right to install conduits
for the fiber optic cables along the corridors, Timothy Elzinga, a property
owner along the right-of-way and the eventual class representative,
disagreed. 85 Elzinga contended that T-Cubed would be committing slander
of title and trespass if T-Cubed
installed the conduit without the permission
86
of the adjacent landowners.
Before the class filed suit, Elzinga and T-Cubed negotiated a proposed
class-wide settlement, presuming Elzinga would be acting as the class
representative.
After the discussions, Elzinga filed suit, while88
simultaneously seeking class certification and approval of the settlement.
The suit sought declaratory relief proclaiming the owners' interest in the land
and injunctive relief prohibiting T-Cubed from engaging in further unlawful
acts. 89
The proposed members of the class were all persons owning real estate
on either side of the railroad tracks along the route T-Cubed proposed to
install the cable. 90 The class was divided into two sub-classes. 9' One subclass consisted of landowners on whose side of the tracks the cable would be
laid (the Cable Side). The other sub-class consisted of landowners on the
other side of the tracks where the cable would not be laid (the Non-Cable
Side). 92 The division was necessary because T-Cubed did not know which
side of the tracks 93it would lay the cable until it conducted detailed
engineering surveys.
The settlement provided that all class members would abandon any
claims and transfer easements to T-Cubed.94 In consideration, the class
members would receive compensation, but the compensation depended on
95
whether the class member was a Cable Side or Non-Cable Side member.
The settlement favored Cable-Side members.96 Under the settlement, each
Cable-Side member would receive $6,000 per linear mile and "a percentage
of T-Cube's revenues from the sale, lease, and license of the conduits it
installs along the corridors." 97 The Cable Side members would also receive
ownership interests in a new company called Class Corridor, which would
initially possess the easements. 98 T-Cubed would then provide Class

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.at 98 .
Id.at 980.
Uhl, 309 F.3d at 980.
Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.at981.
Id.
Id.
at 980.
Id.
Uhl, 309 F.3d at 980.
Id.
at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Corridor with certain assets eventually transferring the easements from Class
Corridor to T-Cubed.9 9 The Non-Cable Side class members would not
receive cash payments. Instead, they would receive similar ownership
interests in Class Corridor. 00 All class members would be entitled to share
in any revenues Class Corridor earned.' 0 '
Also under the settlement terms, class counsel would receive similar
compensation as the class members.' 02 Consequently, "class counsel [could]
never receive compensation that
[was] more advantageous than that which
10 3
[went] to the class members."'
The appellant, an unnamed class member, sought to intervene, claiming
that the settlement was unfair and failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule
23.'1 4 The appellant's main concern was that the benefits to the class
members as it related to Class Corridor were speculative and that the class
members may not receive any compensation.' 0 5 Although the district court
granted the appellant's motion to intervene, it0 overruled
her objections and
6
approved the class certification and settlement.'
A.

Court'sAnalysis

Before addressing class certification issues, the Seventh Circuit
determined two jurisdictional issues.' 0 7 First, the Court determined that the
jurisdictional amount required by diversity jurisdiction 108 was satisfied.l°9 In
doing so, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its position on the "either viewpoint"
rule.' 0 Under this rule, in determining whether the jurisdictional amount is
satisfied, the court will look to either the benefit to the plaintiff or the cost of
the requested relief to the defendant."' The court, therefore, can consider
the cost to the defendant in complying with an injunction. In this case,
Elzinga asserted that T-Cubed would need to spend more than $75,000 to
avoid the costs of injunction and condemnation even if only his land were at
issue. 112By looking at the case from T-Cubed's perspective, the court held
that the jurisdictional amount required was satisfied. 1 3 Second, the Seventh
99. Id.
100. Uhl, 309 F.3d at 982.

101. Id.
102. Id.

103. Id.
104. Id.at981.

105. Id.at982-83.
106. Id.at 981.
107. Uhl, 309 F.3d at 983-84.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (requiring amount in controversy to exceed $75,000).
109. Uhl, 309 F.3d at 984.
110. Id.at 983-84. The Seventh Circuit reconfirmed its espousal of the either viewpoint
rule even in class action cases, declining to follow Ninth Circuit precedent to the contrary.
Id. It refused to follow In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank, 264 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2001),

which held that each claim in a class action must meet the jurisdictional amount. Uhl, 309
F.3d at 983-84.
111. Id at983.
112. Id.at 984.
113. Id.
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Circuit found that the class members' claims were justiciable. 14 Although
the harm to the class members was somewhat uncertain, the court found that
at the time of the settlement the harm
to the title had already occurred. Thus,
5
the slander claim was justiciable.'1
In addressing the class certification issues, the Seventh Circuit started
from the premise that the district court has fiduciary duties to the class when
approving settlements. As a result, the district court must assure itself that
the class representative possesses the same interest and suffered from the
same injury as the class members before approving a settlement.16
The appellant contended that because it was uncertain whether Elzinga
would be a member of the Cable-Side or Non-Cable Side, Elzinga could not
act alone as a class representative." 7 According to the Court, this concern
was inconsequential because at the time of the settlement, Elzinga, like all
the class members, already suffered an injury by the slander. 118 The fact that
Elzinga may not suffer further injury because he might be a Non-Cable Side
class member did not show inadequate representation. 19
The Seventh Circuit also rejected appellant's argument that the
different compensation provided for the Cable Side and Non-Cable Side
made the settlement unfair. 20 It noted that Elzinga himself did not know
whether he would be a member of the Cable Side or Non-Cable Side.
21
Therefore, he had equal incentive to adequately represent both classes.'
The Court concluded that Elzinga possessed a real stake22 in all aspects of the
case. Consequently, the class certification was proper.'
The Court then quickly dispatched with the appellant's contention that
the settlement was unfair. According to the appellant, the settlement could
leave the Non-Cable Side class members without any compensation. 23 The
Seventh Circuit agreed that this risk existed. But it found that because of the
weakness of the class members' claims and relatively minor injury they
suffered or will suffer, the settlement was fair.' 24 Finally, the Court found
that because Class Corridor signed the settlement agreement and was under
the district court's jurisdiction, the district court had not improperly
delegated its authority to it. 125 As a result, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Uhl, 309 F.3d at 985.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 985-86.
119. Id.at 986.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Seventh Circuit also stressed that it was not commenting on whether
differences in ownership rights, state law or other factors barred the certification because
the appellant did not rely argue these issues. In finding that the appellant had waived these
issues, the Court cited Isaacs v. Sprint Corp., 261 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2001), in which the
class certification was reversed despite similar facts. Uhl, 309 F.3d at 986.
123. Id. at 987.
124. Id.
125. Id (distinguishing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.
1987)).
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district court's judgment
in all respects, upholding both the class certification
26
and settlement. 1
B. Analysis and Possible Consequences of the Opinion
The Uhl opinion is curious in at least two respects. First, the Court
almost goes out of its way to acknowledge class counsel's creativity, which
is in stark contrast to the other class action opinions issued by the Seventh
Circuit in 2002. Second, despite reiterating the district courts' duties to
determine that class certifications are proper and that class settlements are
fair, the Seventh Circuit avoided numerous issues that could have resulted in
reversal. In Isaacs v. Sprint Corp., 27 decided only a year earlier, the
Seventh Circuit reversed class certification in a case involving similar
facts. 128 Consequently, the waiver doctrine trumped the Seventh Circuit's
duty to determine the ultimate correctness of the class certification and
settlement.
Hopefully, one possible positive consequence of this opinion is that
class counsel will engage in creative settlements. To the extent that parties
can reach a fair agreement instead of litigating, such practice should be
encouraged.
IV.

IN RE BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC.

Alleged failures of Firestone tires on Ford Explorers have been highly
publicized. In re Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc.' 29 involved counsel for many
plaintiffs seeking to certify a nationwide class against Bridgestone/Firestone
for the alleged tire failures. 130 The Seventh Circuit's opinion in this case
rejected the certification of a nationwide class-action.' 3' In doing so, the
Seventh Circuit espoused the use of market models to reach just results, a
theory the Court based, in part, on federalism. 32 Although the opinion
makes sense, it contains at least one glaring internal contradiction.
A. Facts of Bridgestone/Firestone
As a result of the alleged failures of Firestone tires, injured parties filed
numerous suits across the country. 133 The suits generally involved two types
of injuries: physical injuries occurring as a result of the tire failures and
134
"injuries" by owners of Explorers and/or Firestone tires that did not fail.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred suits filed against
Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford from various federal district courts in the
country to the Southern District of Indiana for consolidated pretrial
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 988.
261 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2001).
Uhl, 309 F.3d at 986.
288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1015.
Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1014.
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proceedings.35 Shortly thereafter, this case was filed in Indianapolis. The
36
plaintiffs sought to certify a nationwide class in this new consolidated suit.
The district court certified two nationwide class-actions: (1) the owners and
lessees of certain models Ford Explorer ("car class")137and (2) the owners and
lessees of certain Firestone tire models ("tire class").
In determining the law that would be applied to these two classes, the
38
district court concluded that under Indiana choice-of-law jurisprudence,'
Michigan law applied to all claims by the car class, and Tennessee law
applied to all claims by the tire class. 139 Although many of the cars were
manufactured in States other than Michigan, and many of the tires were
designed in Ohio and manufactured in states other than Tennessee, the
district court decided that the headquarters of the defendants was the
determining factor in deciding which law to apply. 40 Not surprisingly, Ford
and Firestone sought interlocutory review of the class certifications.141
B.

Court'sAnalysis

The Seventh Circuit initially stated two reasons for accepting the
petitions for interlocutory review. First, the Court stated, "the suit is
exceedingly unlikely to be tried."' 142 According to the Seventh Circuit,
because of the nature and size of the litigation, "settlement becomes almost
inevitable."' 43 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit believed that review of the
class certification decisions before this eventuality was required. 144 Second,
the Court relied on the "important legal issues" justification in labeling the
district court's decision "a novelty."' 145 If the reader of the Court's opinion
had any doubt how the Seventh Circuit would rule, the "novelty" label
should have eliminated any uncertainty.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's analysis of Indiana's
choice-of-law jurisprudence. 146 According to the Court, Indiana is a lex loci
delicti state, meaning Indiana applies the law of the place where the harm
occurred, or more graphically, where the blood spilled. 147 From this starting
point, the Court easily determined that the harm occurred in the state where
each consumer-plaintiff was injured, regardless of whether the claim fell

135. Id. at 1015.
136. Id.
137. Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1015.
138. The Court noted that "[b]ecause plaintiffs' claims rest[ed] on state law, the choiceof-law rules come from the state in which the federal court sits." Id. (citing Klaxon v.

Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
139. Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1015.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.at 1016.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1016.
147. Id.
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under tort, contract or consumer fraud theory.' 48 Consequently, the Seventh
Circuit stated, "Because these claims must be adjudicated under the
law of so
49
many jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is not manageable.'
Having determined the only issue pending before it, the Court engaged
in obiter dicta as a preemptive strike to prevent any argument that the cases
could be litigated as fifty State-based classes.' 50 The Court found that
differences in the possible claims by members of a car class and a tire class
would preclude individual State-based class actions.' 5' For example, there
were differences in the manner and the length of time the cars were driven,
as well as the pressure at which the tires were inflated and the variability of
the tires.' 52 These important differences precluded a finding that common
questions of law and fact predominated over
questions affecting individual
53
members, a requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).1
Following this pre-emptive strike at certifying state-wide class actions,
the Court rejected a fundamental premise of the American Law Institute's
(ALI) Complex Litigation Project. 154 According to the Seventh Circuit, the
ALI's model for managing complex, class-action litigation by centralizing
the issues before a single court is wrong and inefficient. 55 Instead, the Court
reiterated its view that a decentralized process would "get things right":
[O]nly 'a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries,
and different standards of liability, in different jurisdictions' will yield the
information needed for accurate evaluation of mass tort claims. Once a series
of decisions or settlements has produced an accurate evaluation of a subset of
the claims ... the56 others in that subset can be settled or resolved at an
established price.
The Court noted that this type of decentralized process is consistent
with the principles of federalism. 157 Federalism allows, if not promotes,
differences in State laws and these differences must be respected. 158 The
Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court's order certifying two nationwide
classes.159
C. Analysis and Possible Consequences of the Opinion
The Court's decision of Bridgestone/Firestoneis interesting in at least
three respects. First, the decision shows that if a United States Court of
Appeals grants an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23, in all likelihood, it is

148. Id. at 1016-18.
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doing so to reverse the district court's decision. Second, the decision
contains an internal inconsistency. At the outset of the opinion, the Court
states that cases such as these "inevitably" settle.' 60 Then in espousing the
decentralized process, the Court states that the only way to receive a truly6
accurate evaluation of claims is after numerous trials in numerous locales.' 1
Third, one must pause when a federal court engages in pages of dicta and
then bases the rationale for its dicta on federalism. Federalism counsels
federal courts to determine the issues befrre it: no more, no less.
V.

WEST V. PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES, INC.

In West v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 162 the Seventh Circuit reiterated
that the district courts have certain duties when certifying a class. Unlike the
other 2002 decisions, which primarily placed duties upon the district courts
as a result of their fiduciary duties, West instructs the district courts
not to
63
"duck hard questions" when making class certification decisions.'
A.

Facts of West

In West, the plaintiffs alleged that one of Prudential's stockbrokers, a
man named James Hofman, told several customers that in the near future
there would be a purchase of a financial institution named Jefferson Savings
Bancorp (Jefferson Savings) at a premium price. 64 This statement was false,
but Hofman continued making this statement for seven months. 65 The
plaintiffs and the proposed class consisted of individuals who did not hear of
this certain acquisition of Jefferson Savings but who merely purchased its
66
stock during the seven-month period when Hofman was spreading his lie.'
The district court certified the class relying on the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine.' 67 68
Thereafter, Prudential sought an interlocutory appeal of the
certification. 1
B.

Court'sAnalysis

Initially, the Seventh Circuit stated it would hear the interlocutory
appeal for two reasons. 69 First, the Court stated that the district court's
decision "mark[ed] a substantial extension of the fraud-on-the-market
approach," such that the appeal "present[ed] a novel and potentially
important question of law."' 170 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit expressed
belief that the district court erred in its expansion of the fraud-on-the-market

160. Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1016.
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doctrine. Second, the Court reasoned that because most securities class
actions settle, an interlocutory appeal might be the only way for the Seventh
Circuit to pass on this issue. 17' As a sub-justification, the Court noted that
once securities class actions are certified, defendants "pay substantial sums
even when the plaintiffs have weak positions."' 72 Essentially, the Court
recognized the view that most securities class actions are like stick-ups. For
these reasons, the Court took the interlocutory appeal.
The Seventh Circuit then addressed the merits of the class certification,
focusing on the lack of causation.' 73 Relying primarily on secondary
sources, the Court discussed how public information affects securities prices,
stating the economic axiom that securities prices adjust quickly to public
information.1 74 But, the class certification in West was based upon nonpublic information. 175 According to the Seventh Circuit, no causal link
existed between this non-public information and7 6Jefferson Savings' stock
prices; therefore, class certification was improper.
In determining the lack of causation and the necessity of a remand, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the testimony of the plaintiffs expert witness, who
stated that the price of Jefferson Savings stock rose during the seven-month
period when Hofman was allegedly spreading his lie.' 77 In making this
determination, the Court, sua sponte, engaged in an appellate, Daubert
challenge to the expert's testimony. According to the Seventh Circuit, this
was the type of analysis the district court should have conducted instead of
basing its class certification on the plaintiffs' ability to obtain a competent
economist to testify on their behalf. 7 8 The Seventh Circuit stated,
A district judge may not duck hard questions by observing that each side has
some support, or that considerations relevant to class certification may also
affect the decision on the merits. Tough questions must be faced and squarely
decided, if necessary by79holding evidentiary hearings and choosing between
competing perspectives. 1
In rejecting the plaintiffs' expert testimony, the Court engaged in a
thorough economic analysis. But, the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the
testimony was the classic criticism of most experts' opinions: they find
relations, not causation.18° Causation between two events, not relationship
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between two events, is required of any expert's testimony. 181 Consequently,
the Seventh Circuit held that the record before the district court did not
support the extension of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine82to Hofman's
alleged statements about the acquisition of Jefferson Savings. 1
C. Analysis and Possible Consequences of the Opinion
Although the main focus of West is the fraud-on-the-market theory, the
opinion places a heavy burden on the district courts. A fundamental
principle of class action certification is that the district court may not
consider the merits of the plaintiffs claim. 83 In requiring district courts to
decide tough questions squarely "by holding evidentiary hearings and
choosing between competing perspectives,"' 84 the Seventh Circuit makes a
district court judge come extremely close to a merit-based determination of
the plaintiffs claim. It seems likely that more district courts will now hold
evidentiary hearings when determining class actions. In the past, class
certification depended on either the allegations in the complaint alone or the
parties' evidentiary submissions with their papers in support of, or in
opposition to, the motion for class certification.
VI. CULVER V. CITY OF MILWAUKEE

In Culver v. City of Milwaukee,185 the Seventh Circuit made clear its
view that class actions are commonly nothing more than vehicles that class
action plaintiffs' attorneys use to achieve wealth.186 As a result of this view,
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Culver is a good example of the Court
holding the district courts accountable in fulfilling their fiduciary duties to
the purported class.
A.

Facts of Culver

In 1993, Culver, the plaintiff class representative, claimed that he
requested a job application from the Milwaukee police department but was
told he could not receive one because the department would not accept

181. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 179,

184 (2000) (stating "A correlation between two

variables does not imply that one event causes the second.").
182. West, 282 F.3d at 940.
183. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
184. Id.at938.
185. 277 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2002).
186. The Court reasoned that:

Often the class representative has a merely nominal stake ... and the real plaintiff
in interest is then the lawyer for the class, who may have interests that diverge from
those of the class members. The lawyer for the class is not hired by the members of
the class and his fee will be determined by the court rather than by contract with
paying clients. The cases have remarked the danger that the lawyer will sell out the
class in exchange for the defendant's tacit agreement not to challenge the lawyer's
fee request.
Culver, 277 F.3d at 910.
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applications from white males that year. 87 Shortly after filing the suit, the
plaintiff obtained a different job, with which he was content.'88 In 1995, the
district court certified a single class consisting of white males who had been
refused job applications and white males who had applied yet were not
hired. 8 9 Over the next six years, plaintiff s counsel did very little to advance
the case. 190 Then in 1999, a different district court judge, to whom the case
had been reassigned, decertified the class.' 9' In doing so, the district court
found that the class was improper and that the plaintiff was not an adequate
class representative for any possible sub-class.' 92 The district court then
193
dismissed the entire suit as moot.
B.

Court'sAnalysis

The Seventh Circuit initially noted that Rule 23 possesses two related
requirements that attempt to prevent class action abuse.' 94 First, Rule 23
requires that the class be reasonably homogeneous. Second, Rule 23
requires a class representative to be an adequate representative of the
class.' 95
In deciding the case, the Court found that the proposed class was
heterogeneous. 196 The Court relied on three differences between the class
members who did not receive applications and those who received them and
completed them, but were not hired. 197 The Court concluded that the class
members who did not even receive an application would be difficult to
identify and would also have to prove that they had the minimum
qualifications required for employment with the police department. 198 In
addition, these class members, unlike the class members who received the
applications, would not need to show that their entrance exams were scored
in a discriminatory manner. 199 Consequently, at best, the class should have
been divided into sub-classes, 200 but plaintiffs counsel refused to have the
class divided. 20' Furthermore, plaintiffs counsel made no attempt to find a
more suitable class representative for the second subclass.20 2 These inactions
provided the Court with a justification to support the de-certification of the
class.20 3 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit had little difficulty in affirming
187. Id. at 910.
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the district court's decision to decertify the class.204
However, despite finding that the de-certification was proper and that
the class representative's claim was moot, the Seventh Circuit remanded the
case and announced a rule that imposes an additional burden on the district
courts in the Circuit. 20 5 In remanding, the Court stated that Rule 23(e)
requires the district court to give notice of the dismissal to all class
members. 20 6 The Seventh Circuit imposed this duty on the district court in
all cases of dismissal, regardless of whether the dismissal results from a
settlement or judicial decision and regardless of whether the dismissal occurs
before or after certification. 20 7 The justification for this imposition was the
potential danger that the statute of limitations for other class members'
claims may expire without their knowledge. 20 8 The only exception the Court
gave to this notice requirement was when there is no risk of prejudice to the
class absent notice of the dismissal.20 9 In requiring that notice of dismissal
be given to class members, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Rule 23(e) should therefore be understood as imposing a duty on the district
judge that is nondelegable, he being himself a fiduciary of the class. The
judge's duty is to order notice unless the risk of prejudice to absent class
the form of notice proposed by
members is nil and to review for adequacy
2
class counsel in response to the order. 10
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the de-certification of the class and
dismissal of the class representative's suit, but remanded the case to the
district court to require that notice be provided to all absent class
members.211
C. Analysis and Possible Consequences of the Opinion
Defense counsel will likely quote the colorful language in Culver at any
opportunity. Culver will also be cited by those individuals who share the
view that class action counsel are often the real parties in interest. More
importantly, Culver mandates yet another burden on district courts saddled
with class actions. Most district courts require notice to class members when
the parties settle. Culver expands this obligation by requiring district judges
in the Seventh Circuit to now require district courts to give notice of all
dismissals of all class actions, particularly when the classes had not been
certified. The plaintiffs' counsel, who likely has little incentive to expend
time and money publicizing a recently lost case, must provide such notice.
To counteract this lack of incentive, district courts will need to be vigilant if
they are to fulfill their duty under Culver.
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ANALYSIS OF SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S NOTABLE CLASS-ACTION DECISIONS

The Seventh Circuit's class action decisions were rough on plaintiff
class action attorneys and district court judges, primarily because the Court is
skeptical of the motivations of plaintiffs' class counsel. As a result of this
skepticism, the Seventh Circuit now requires district courts to thoroughly
exercise the fiduciary duties it placed upon them. Additionally, with the
defendants in Payton seeking review by the United States Supreme Court,
the juridical link doctrine will likely be analyzed further in the future,
regardless of whether the Supreme Court grants certiorai.

